Approximating principal-agent problem under Bayesian

DOI10.1007/978-981-97-7752-5_15MaRDI QIDQ6989688zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Qinqin Gong, Ling Gai, Yijing Wang, Dachuan Xu, Ruiqi Yang

Publication date 29 April 2025

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-7752-5_15

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian principal-agent modelcontracts theorylinear contractssubmodularity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Algorithms in computer science (68Wxx)

Cites work

• A threshold of ln n for approximating set cover
• Adaptive contract design for crowdsourcing markets: bandit algorithms for repeated principal-agent problems
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• An analysis of approximations for maximizing submodular set functions—I
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Combinatorial agency
• Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
• Combinatorial contracts
• Combinatorial contracts beyond Gross substitutes
• Computing optimal contracts in combinatorial agencies
• Free-riding and free-labor in combinatorial agency
• Maximizing sums of non-monotone submodular and linear functions: understanding the unconstrained case
• Mixed strategies in combinatorial agency
• Multi-agent contracts
• On supermodular contracts and dense subgraphs
• On the (In)approximability of combinatorial contracts
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard
• The complexity of contracts
• The complexity of finding Nash equilibria

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