Contract design for afforestation programs

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_7MaRDI QIDQ2152108OpenAlexFDO

Authors Wanyi Dai Li, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier

Publication date 6 July 2022

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_7

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11)

Recommendations

• Optimal contract arrangements for conservation on working forests
• Optimal Forestry Contracts under Asymmetry of Information
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• Optimal forestry contract with interdependent costs
• Green payments and dual policy goals

Cites work

• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Eliciting Risk and Time Preferences

Cited in

(3)

• Multi-agent contracts
• How to design an incentive mechanism of enterprises to farmers in contract farming considering reciprocity preference
• Optimal contract arrangements for conservation on working forests

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