Optimal forestry contract with interdependent costs
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Publication:2098931
DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2016-0058OpenAlexW2808492322WikidataQ129725289 ScholiaQ129725289MaRDI QIDQ2098931
Paul Samuel Njiki, Francis Didier Tatoutchoup
Publication date: 22 November 2022
Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2016-0058
Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Mechanism design theory (91B03) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)
Cites Work
- Deriving an estimate of the optimal reserve price: An application to British Columbian timber sales
- Multiple unit auctions of an indivisible good
- Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Extracting the Surplus in the Common-Value Auction
- Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach
- Optimal Forestry Contracts under Asymmetry of Information
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