Optimal forestry contract with interdependent costs

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2016-0058OpenAlexW2808492322WikidataQ129725289 ScholiaQ129725289MaRDI QIDQ2098931

Paul Samuel Njiki, Francis Didier Tatoutchoup

Publication date: 22 November 2022

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2016-0058

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsmechanism designforest rotationFaustmann ruleforestry contractinterdependent costs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Mechanism design theory (91B03) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Cites Work

• Deriving an estimate of the optimal reserve price: An application to British Columbian timber sales
• Multiple unit auctions of an indivisible good
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Extracting the Surplus in the Common-Value Auction
• Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach
• Optimal Forestry Contracts under Asymmetry of Information

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