Extracting the Surplus in the Common-Value Auction
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Publication:4207764
DOI10.2307/1913717zbMath0688.90012OpenAlexW2077915842MaRDI QIDQ4207764
R. Preston McAfee, John McMillan, Philip J. Reny
Publication date: 1989
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1913717
Related Items (10)
Ex-post full surplus extraction, straightforwardly ⋮ An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction ⋮ Prizes and patents: using market signals to provide incentives for innovations ⋮ Asymmetric all‐pay auctions with spillovers ⋮ Continuity in auction design ⋮ Principal-Agent Models ⋮ Revenue and reserve prices in a probabilistic single item auction ⋮ A Stone-Weierstrass Theorem Without Closure Under Suprema ⋮ Optimal forestry contract with interdependent costs ⋮ Common-value auctions with discrete private information
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