Revenue and reserve prices in a probabilistic single item auction

DOI10.1007/S00453-015-0055-1MaRDI QIDQ513288zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Noga Alon, Moran Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz

Publication date 6 March 2017

Published in Algorithmica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-015-0055-1

zbMATH Keywords

revenue maximizationsecond price auctionsreserve pricessingle item auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Reserve prices eliminate low revenue equilibria in uniform price auctions
• Optimal auctions vs. anonymous pricing
• Revenue maximization with a single sample
• Reserve prices without commitment
• Reserve price efficiency and competitive pressure in auctions

Cites work

• Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with Incomplete Information
• Extracting the Surplus in the Common-Value Auction
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers

Cited in

(5)

• Efficient empirical revenue maximization in single-parameter auction environments
• A simple result for the revenue in share auctions.
• A lower bound on seller revenue in single buyer monopoly auctions
• Revenue ranking of first-price auctions with resale
• Properties of bid and ask reservation prices in the rank-dependent expected utility model

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