Test Design Under Falsification

DOI10.3982/ECTA16346MaRDI QIDQ6041126zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Eduardo Perez-Richet, Vasiliki Skreta

Publication date 26 May 2023

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta16346

zbMATH Keywords

cheatingfalsificationinformation designmanipulationpersuasiontests

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Recommendations

• Test design under voluntary participation
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Cited in

(19)

• Test design under voluntary participation
• Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion
• Testing, disclosure and approval
• Persuasion with limited communication capacity
• Communication with endogenous deception costs
• Information design through scarcity and social learning
• Falsification and Future Performance
• Reasonable doubt
• Persuasion with unknown beliefs
• Optimal transparency of monitoring capability
• Rules and commitment in communication: an experimental analysis
• Testing under information manipulation
• Implementing randomized allocation rules with outcome-contingent transfers
• Mechanism design for acquisition of/stochastic evidence
• Persuasion without ex-post commitment
• Lying in persuasion
• Designing interrogations
• Algorithmic contract theory: a survey
• Sequential decisions with tests

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