Persuasion without ex-post commitment

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2025.106058MaRDI QIDQ6933936zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Sophie Kreutzkamp, Yichuan Lou

Publication date 3 September 2025

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JET.2025.106058

zbMATH Keywords

bi-poolingnoisy signalsvalue of commitments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites work

• Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment
• Bayesian persuasion with costly messages
• Censorship as optimal persuasion
• Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives
• Communication with endogenous information acquisition
• Costly miscalibration
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
• Extreme points and majorization: economic applications
• Informational control and organizational design
• Long Cheap Talk
• Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach
• Optimal persuasion via bi‐pooling
• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• Rules and commitment in communication: an experimental analysis
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Test Design Under Falsification
• The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication

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