Delegated concept testing in new product development

DOI10.1287/OPRE.2022.2318MaRDI QIDQ5058037zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jochen Schlapp, Gerrit Schumacher

Publication date 1 December 2022

Published in Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2022.2318

zbMATH Keywords

incentivesinformation acquisitionproject selectionresource allocationsearch theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Inventory, storage, reservoirs (90B05) Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50)

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Cites work

• A more general Pandora rule?
• A principal-agent model of sequential testing
• A theoretical framework for managing the new product development portfolio: when and how to use strategic buckets
• Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise
• Dynamic contracts with moral hazard and adverse selection
• Experimentation and project selection: screening and learning
• Learning while searching for the best alternative
• Managing experimentation in the design of new products
• On the Value of Commitment with Asymmetric Information
• On uncertainty, ambiguity, and complexity in project management
• Optimal contracts for experimentation
• Optimal delegated search with adverse selection and moral hazard
• Optimal Search for the Best Alternative
• Whether or not to open Pandora's box

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