A principal-agent model of sequential testing

DOI10.3982/TE914MaRDI QIDQ4586108zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors D. Gerardi, Lucas Maestri

Publication date 11 September 2018

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/TE914

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic mechanism designinformation acquisitionsequential testing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50)

Recommendations

• The simple analytics of information and experimentation in dynamic agency
• The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
• Sequential decisions with tests
• Information design and sequential screening with ex post participation constraint
• Robust incentives for information acquisition

Cites work

• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise
• Contracts and productive information gathering
• Monopoly and product quality
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Will truth out? -- An advisor's quest to appear competent

Cited in

(29)

• Hierarchical experimentation
• Hidden testing and selective disclosure of evidence
• Dynamic information design: a simple problem on optimal sequential information disclosure
• Learning, belief manipulation and optimal relationship termination
• Optimal contract for outsourcing information acquisition
• Learning from failures: optimal contracts for experimentation and production
• Robust incentives for information acquisition
• Experimentation and project selection: screening and learning
• Monitoring innovation
• Impacts of uncertain project duration and asymmetric risk sensitivity information in project management
• Sequential investments, know-how transmission, and optimal organization
• Information design and sequential screening with ex post participation constraint
• The Economics of Clear Advice and Extreme Options
• The importance of being honest
• Optimal adaptive testing: informativeness and incentives
• Information provision before a contract is offered
• Delegated concept testing in new product development
• Changing One's Mind when the Facts Change: Incentives of Experts and the Design of Reporting Protocols
• Paying with information
• Delegation of information acquisition, information asymmetry, and outside option
• Innovation through competitive experimentation
• Screening for experiments
• Information acquisition and countervailing incentives
• Dynamic information provision: rewarding the past and guiding the future
• Who benefits from covert evidence acquisition in principal-agent interactions?
• Testing under information manipulation
• The simple analytics of information and experimentation in dynamic agency
• Rewarding success and failure: moral hazard and adverse selection in strategic experimentation
• Sequential decisions with tests

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