Who benefits from covert evidence acquisition in principal-agent interactions?

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2024.111675MaRDI QIDQ6549846zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Kym Pram

Publication date 4 June 2024

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ECONLET.2024.111675

zbMATH Keywords

contract theoryhard evidenceinformation acquisitionmechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Principal-agent models (91B43)

Recommendations

• Contracts with endogenous information
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• The costs and benefits of additional information in agency models with endogenous information structures
• A principal-agent model of sequential testing

Cites work

• Contracts and productive information gathering

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