Information provision before a contract is offered

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.06.037zbMATH Open1302.91129OpenAlexW2110918070MaRDI QIDQ485733FDOQ485733

Authors: Jaesoo Kim, Dongsoo Shin 

Publication date: 14 January 2015

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.06.037

Recommendations

• Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
• The value of preference information in agency relationships
• A principal-agent model of sequential testing
• Contracts and productive information gathering
• Information Control in the Principal-Agent Problem

zbMATH Keywords

agency contractinginformation provisioninformation rent

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Sequential screening
• Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• The costs and benefits of additional information in agency models with endogenous information structures

Cited In (3)

• Gathering imperfect information before signing a contract
• The value of preference information in agency relationships
• Preordered service in contract enforcement

This page was built for publication: Information provision before a contract is offered

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q485733)