Hierarchical experimentation
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Cites work
- A principal-agent model of sequential testing
- Bargaining and Reputation
- Bargaining with imperfect commitment
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
- Experimentation in Markets
- Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts
- Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation
- Investment timing and learning externalities
- Learning and information aggregation in an exit game
- Learning while voting: determinants of collective experimentation
- Negatively Correlated Bandits
- Optimal Regulation in the Presence of Reputation Concerns *
- Optimal contracts for experimentation
- Reputation and Survival: Learning in a Dynamic Signalling Model
- Reputational bargaining with minimal knowledge of rationality
- Stationary multi-choice bandit problems.
- Strategic Experimentation
- Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits
- The war of information
- Waiting for news in the market for lemons
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