Experimentation in organizations

DOI10.3982/TE3069MaRDI QIDQ6059552zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sofia Moroni

Publication date 2 November 2023

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te3069

zbMATH Keywords

contestsexperimentationexponential banditmoral hazardprincipal-agent

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Recommendations

• Learning from failures: optimal contracts for experimentation and production
• Hierarchical experimentation
• Optimal contracts for experimentation
• Innovation through competitive experimentation
• Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations

Cites work

• Dynamic contracts when the agent's quality is unknown
• Functional analysis, calculus of variations and optimal control
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3992265 (Why is no real title available?)
• Negatively Correlated Bandits
• Optimal contracts for experimentation
• Prizes versus contracts as incentives for innovation
• Projects and team dynamics
• Strategic Experimentation
• Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits
• The importance of being honest
• The Wage Policy of a Firm

Cited in

(7)

• Monitoring innovation
• Strategic Experimentation
• Innovation through competitive experimentation
• Information disclosure in mitigating moral hazard: an experimental investigation
• Delegating trial and error
• Experimentation in endogenous organizations
• Rewarding success and failure: moral hazard and adverse selection in strategic experimentation

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