Paying with information

DOI10.3982/TE4465MaRDI QIDQ6076905zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ayça Kaya

Publication date 17 October 2023

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te4465

zbMATH Keywords

agency costsinformation controlinformational incentives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Recommendations

• Contracts and productive information gathering
• A principal-agent model of sequential testing
• Informed principal and information gathering agent
• Learning, termination, and payout policy in dynamic incentive contracts
• Learning from failures: optimal contracts for experimentation and production

Cites work

• A model of Bayesian persuasion with transfers
• Frequent monitoring in dynamic contracts
• Optimal dynamic information provision
• Persuasion with limited communication capacity
• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns

Cited in

(4)

• Making money out of publicly available information
• ENTREPRENEUR–INVESTOR INFORMATION DESIGN
• Dynamic information provision: rewarding the past and guiding the future
• Feedback design in dynamic moral hazard

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