Restrictions and agent selection

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2026.103297MaRDI QIDQ7364446zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Dongsoo Shin, Sungho Yun

Publication date 2 October 2026

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JMATECO.2026.103297

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91Bxx)

Cites work

• A Model of Delegated Project Choice
• A theory of optimal deadlines
• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Continuity in mechanism design without transfers
• Contracts and productive information gathering
• Contracts with endogenous information
• Efficient and optimal mechanisms with private information acquisition costs
• Information acquisition and countervailing incentives
• Optimal Delegation
• Principal and expert agent
• Strategy and dynamics in contests
• The Economics of Clear Advice and Extreme Options
• The theory of contests: a survey

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