Characterizing implementability via weak monotonicity on unit demand valuation domains

DOI10.1007/S10479-026-07301-YMaRDI QIDQ7314187zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors S. C. Agarwal, Souvik Roy

Publication date 14 August 2026

Published in Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S10479-026-07301-Y

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites work

• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
• Convex Analysis
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Extremal incentive compatible transfers
• Gross substitution, discrete convexity, and submodularity
• Implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains
• Mechanism design without revenue equivalence
• Mechanism design. A linear programming approach.
• Monotonicity and implementability
• Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
• Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces
• Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
• On the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms and the payoff equivalence principle
• Optimal Auction Design
• Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist
• Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
• Weak monotonicity and Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility
• Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation

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