Monotonicity and implementability
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Recommendations
- Monotonicity in mechanism design (abstract)
- Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences
- Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
- Implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains
- Characterizing incentive compatibility for convex valuations
Cited in
(33)- Conditions for incentive compatibility in models with multidimensional allocation functions and one-dimensional types
- A lower bound of \(1+\varphi \) for truthful scheduling mechanisms
- Truthful germs are contagious: a local-to-global characterization of truthfulness
- Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles
- Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer
- Multi-unit auctions: beyond Roberts
- Implementability with contingent contracts
- On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities
- Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments
- Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences
- Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments
- Incentive compatibility in non-quasilinear environments
- Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
- Dominant strategy implementation with a convex product space of valuations
- Truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation
- Synergy of monotonic rules
- Characterization of truthful mechanisms for one-dimensional single facility location game with payments
- Monotonicity in mechanism design (abstract)
- Characterizing incentive compatibility for convex valuations
- Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces
- Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach
- Implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains
- Incentive compatible market design with applications
- Unrestricted domain extensions of dominant strategy implementable allocation functions
- A Characterization of Combinatorial Demand
- Testing the quantal response hypothesis
- Monotonicity Analysis Can Speed Up Verification
- The polyhedral geometry of truthful auctions
- Detecting profitable deviations
- Implementing randomized allocation rules with outcome-contingent transfers
- The polyhedral geometry of truthful auctions
- Characterizing implementability via weak monotonicity on unit demand valuation domains
- Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences
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