Characterizing incentive compatibility for convex valuations

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-04645-2_4MaRDI QIDQ3648840zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors André Berger, Rudolf Müller, Seyed Hossein Naeemi

Publication date 1 December 2009

Published in Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04645-2_4

zbMATH Keywords

convexityincentive compatibilitymechanism designsocial choice theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cited in

(8)

• Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles
• Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments
• Incentive compatibility in non-quasilinear environments
• Dominant strategy implementation with a convex product space of valuations
• A strict ex-post incentive compatible mechanism for interdependent valuations
• Monotonicity and implementability
• Testing the quantal response hypothesis
• Local incentive compatibility on gross substitutes and other non-convex type-spaces

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