Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments
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Publication:2353701
DOI10.1007/s00355-014-0837-4zbMath1318.91099MaRDI QIDQ2353701
Debasis Mishra, Thierry Marchant
Publication date: 16 July 2015
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0837-4
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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