Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments

DOI10.1007/S00355-014-0837-4MaRDI QIDQ2353701zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Thierry Marchant, Debasis Mishra

Publication date 16 July 2015

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0837-4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Robust Mechanism Design
• Mechanism design without quasilinearity
• Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces
• Mechanism design without revenue equivalence
• Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers

Cites work

• A modular approach to Roberts' theorem
• Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
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• Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency
• Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
• Two simplified proofs for Roberts' theorem
• Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation

Cited in

(12)

• Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers
• The characterization of affine maximizers on restricted domains with two alternatives
• Upper set rules with binary ranges
• Binary public decisions and undominated mechanisms
• Balanced implementability of sequencing rules
• Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments
• Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
• A modular approach to Roberts' theorem
• Mechanism design without quasilinearity
• Characterization of Vickrey auction with reserve price for multiple objects
• The Walker-Groves-Ledyard mechanism: improving individual rationality without sacrificing simplicity or stability
• Binary public decisions with a status quo: undominated mechanisms without harm

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