First-best collusion without communication

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.007zbMath1284.91189OpenAlexW1984884244MaRDI QIDQ2437177

Shiran Rachmilevitch

Publication date: 3 March 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.007

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsrepeated gamescollusion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (2)

Optimal implicit collusion in repeated procurement auctions ⋮ Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions

Cites Work

• Private monitoring in auctions
• Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
• Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions
• Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks
• Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information

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