First-best collusion without communication

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.11.007zbMATH Open1284.91189OpenAlexW1984884244MaRDI QIDQ2437177FDOQ2437177

Authors: Shiran Rachmilevitch 

Publication date: 3 March 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.007

Recommendations

• Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction
• Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication
• Collusion through communication in auctions
• Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
• Bidder collusion at first-price auctions

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamescollusionauctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) 2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
• Private monitoring in auctions
• Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks
• Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
• Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions

Cited In (6)

• Optimal implicit collusion in repeated procurement auctions
• Collusion through communication in auctions
• Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction
• Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions

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