First-best collusion without communication

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.11.007MaRDI QIDQ2437177zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Shiran Rachmilevitch

Publication date 3 March 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.007

zbMATH Keywords

auctionscollusionrepeated games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction
• Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication
• Collusion through communication in auctions
• Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
• Bidder collusion at first-price auctions

Cites work

• Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
• Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
• Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks
• Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions
• Private monitoring in auctions
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information

Cited in

(7)

• Optimal implicit collusion in repeated procurement auctions
• Collusion through communication in auctions
• Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction
• Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1944103 (Why is no real title available?)
• Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions
• Transaction fee mechanisms robust to welfare-increasing collusion

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