Detail-free mechanism design in twice iterative dominance: Large economies

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2007.09.004zbMATH Open1140.91448OpenAlexW1996782901MaRDI QIDQ938058FDOQ938058

Authors: Hitoshi Matsushima 

Publication date: 18 August 2008

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.09.004

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zbMATH Keywords

interdependent valueslarge economiesdetail-free mechanismstwice iterative dominanceunique implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60)

Cites Work

• Microeconomic theory
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Exact implementation
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
• Role of honesty in full implementation
• Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium
• Bayesian Implementation
• Existence of equilibrium in large double auctions
• Private information in large economies
• Bayesian monotonicity with side payments
• Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (4)

• Mechanism design with level-k types: theory and an application to bilateral trade
• Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading
• The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets
• Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty

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