Correlation, independence, and Bayesian incentives
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Publication:2568837
DOI10.1007/s00355-003-0260-8zbMath1073.91570OpenAlexW2111097394MaRDI QIDQ2568837
Louis-André Gérard-Varet, Claude d'Aspremont, Jacques Crémer
Publication date: 19 October 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/2376/1/Cremer_2376.pdf
Bayesian problems; characterization of Bayes procedures (62C10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)
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