Target-oriented regret minimization for satisficing monopolists

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-48974-7_32MaRDI QIDQ6609174zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Napat Rujeerapaiboon, Yize Wei, Yilin Xue

Publication date 20 September 2024

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48974-7_32

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designmonopoly pricingregret minimizationrobust optimizationsatisficing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Internet topics (68M11) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites work

• Adjustable robust optimization reformulations of two-stage worst-case regret minimization problems
• Data-driven distributionally robust optimization using the Wasserstein metric: performance guarantees and tractable reformulations
• Distributionally Robust Convex Optimization
• Distributionally robust optimization under moment uncertainty with application to data-driven problems
• Globalized Robust Optimization for Nonlinear Uncertain Inequalities
• Mechanism design. A linear programming approach.
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions
• Regret in the Newsvendor Model with Partial Information
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Robust monopoly pricing
• Robust multidimensional pricing: separation without regret
• Robust optimization
• Robust Satisficing
• Robust screening under ambiguity
• The Theory of Statistical Decision
• Theory and applications of robust optimization

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