Efficient sequential screening with informational externalities

DOI10.1007/S00199-022-01416-6MaRDI QIDQ6107368zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Boaz Zik

Publication date 3 July 2023

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-022-01416-6

zbMATH Keywords

efficient mechanismsefficient privatizationinformational externalitiesinterdependent valuationsmultidimensional informationsequential screening

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Welfare economics (91B15) Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

• The scope of sequential screening with ex post participation constraints
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Cites work

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• An efficient dynamic mechanism
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• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Efficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations: the role of contingent transfers
• Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations
• Equivalence of stochastic and deterministic mechanisms
• Ex post information rents in sequential screening
• Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
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• Multistage Games with Communication
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
• Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre-Project Planning
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• Pre-sale information
• Sequential information disclosure in auctions
• Sequential screening
• Sequential versus static screening: an equivalence result
• The dynamic pivot mechanism

Cited in

(6)

• The optimal sequential information acquisition structure: a rational utility-maximizing perspective
• Coordinating adoption decisions under externalities and incomplete information
• Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process
• Robust implementation in sequential information design under supermodular payoffs and objective
• Screening while controlling an externality
• Sequential screening with unknown mean and spread

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