Advance-purchase discounts as a price discrimination device
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Publication:629327
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2010.07.008zbMATH Open1244.91041OpenAlexW3123457343MaRDI QIDQ629327FDOQ629327
Authors: Volker Nocke, Martin Peitz, Frank Rosar 
Publication date: 9 March 2011
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:3212e9c1-651e-4b27-b315-6518f460e9ca
Recommendations
price discriminationdemand uncertaintymechanism designmonopoly pricingadvance-purchase discountintertemporal pricingintroductory offers
Cites Work
Cited In (16)
- Sellouts, beliefs, and bandwagon behavior
- SELLING IN ADVANCE TO LOSS AVERSE CONSUMERS
- Efficient sequential screening with informational externalities
- Sequential versus static screening: an equivalence result
- Dynamic mechanism design: dynamic arrivals and changing values
- Optimal sequential delegation
- Pricing and referrals in diffusion on networks
- Partial refunds as a strategic price commitment device in advance selling in a service industry
- Economic purchasing strategies for temporary price discounts
- Optimal crowdfunding design
- Crowdfunding mechanism comparison when product quality is uncertain
- Ex post information rents in sequential screening
- A model of advance selling with consumer heterogeneity and limited capacity
- Multi-buyer discount pricing
- Revenue management by sequential screening
- Pareto-optimal reinsurance with default risk and solvency regulation
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