Advance-purchase discounts as a price discrimination device

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2010.07.008zbMath1244.91041OpenAlexW3123457343MaRDI QIDQ629327

Martin Peitz, Frank Rosar, Volker Nocke

Publication date: 9 March 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:3212e9c1-651e-4b27-b315-6518f460e9ca

zbMATH Keywords

intertemporal pricingmechanism designdemand uncertaintyprice discriminationmonopoly pricingadvance-purchase discountintroductory offers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Related Items

Optimal sequential delegation, A model of advance selling with consumer heterogeneity and limited capacity, Sequential versus static screening: an equivalence result, Crowdfunding mechanism comparison when product quality is uncertain, Efficient sequential screening with informational externalities, Revenue management by sequential screening, Pareto-optimal reinsurance with default risk and solvency regulation, Pricing and referrals in diffusion on networks, Dynamic mechanism design: dynamic arrivals and changing values, Partial refunds as a strategic price commitment device in advance selling in a service industry, Optimal crowdfunding design, Sellouts, beliefs, and bandwagon behavior, Ex post information rents in sequential screening

Cites Work

• Log-concave probability and its applications
• Sequential Screening
• Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination