Advance-purchase discounts as a price discrimination device
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Publication:629327
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(18)- Efficient sequential screening with informational externalities
- Sequential versus static screening: an equivalence result
- Multi-buyer discount pricing
- Dynamic mechanism design: dynamic arrivals and changing values
- Revenue management by sequential screening
- A model analysis on advance booking discount program
- A model of advance selling with consumer heterogeneity and limited capacity
- Optimal sequential delegation
- Optimal crowdfunding design
- Partial refunds as a strategic price commitment device in advance selling in a service industry
- Economic purchasing strategies for temporary price discounts
- Pareto-optimal reinsurance with default risk and solvency regulation
- SELLING IN ADVANCE TO LOSS AVERSE CONSUMERS
- All-units discounts and double moral hazard
- Ex post information rents in sequential screening
- Sellouts, beliefs, and bandwagon behavior
- Crowdfunding mechanism comparison when product quality is uncertain
- Pricing and referrals in diffusion on networks
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