Advance-purchase discounts as a price discrimination device

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2010.07.008zbMATH Open1244.91041OpenAlexW3123457343MaRDI QIDQ629327FDOQ629327

Authors Volker Nocke, Martin Peitz, Frank Rosar 

Publication date 9 March 2011

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:3212e9c1-651e-4b27-b315-6518f460e9ca

zbMATH Keywords

price discriminationdemand uncertaintymechanism designmonopoly pricingadvance-purchase discountintertemporal pricingintroductory offers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Recommendations

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Cites Work

• Log-concave probability and its applications
• Sequential screening
• Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination

Cited In (18)

• Sellouts, beliefs, and bandwagon behavior
• SELLING IN ADVANCE TO LOSS AVERSE CONSUMERS
• Efficient sequential screening with informational externalities
• Sequential versus static screening: an equivalence result
• Dynamic mechanism design: dynamic arrivals and changing values
• Optimal sequential delegation
• Pricing and referrals in diffusion on networks
• All-units discounts and double moral hazard
• Partial refunds as a strategic price commitment device in advance selling in a service industry
• Economic purchasing strategies for temporary price discounts
• Optimal crowdfunding design
• Crowdfunding mechanism comparison when product quality is uncertain
• Ex post information rents in sequential screening
• A model of advance selling with consumer heterogeneity and limited capacity
• Multi-buyer discount pricing
• Revenue management by sequential screening
• A model analysis on advance booking discount program
• Pareto-optimal reinsurance with default risk and solvency regulation

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