Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
- Efficient sequential screening with informational externalities
- Optimal screening by risk-averse principals
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 895651
- Mechanism design for general screening problems with moral hazard
- Optimal contracts with random monitoring
- A probablistic analysis for an optimal screening problem
- Sequential versus static screening: an equivalence result
- DEALING WITH MONOTONICITY CONSTRAINTS IN SCREENING PROBLEMS: THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL
- Ex post information rents in sequential screening
Cited in
(14)- Dynamic contracting under permanent and transitory private information
- Dynamic mechanism design: dynamic arrivals and changing values
- A theory of dynamic contracting with financial constraints
- Ex post information rents in sequential screening
- Gathering imperfect information before signing a contract
- Deals or no deals: contract design for online advertising
- Screening with privacy on (im)persistency
- Optimal procurement and investment in new technologies under uncertainty
- Intertemporal bundling
- The dynamics of project standards
- Evolving influence: mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships
- Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design
- Dynamic revenue maximization: a continuous time approach
- Dynamic screening with limited commitment
This page was built for publication: Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4610566)
