Intertemporal bundling
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Cites work
- An introduction to copulas.
- An introduction to the theory of mechanism design. With contributions by Daniel Krähmer and Roland Strausz
- Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
- Bundling decisions for selling multiple objects
- Competitive bundling
- Countervailing incentives in agency problems
- Dynamic mechanism design on social networks
- Dynamic mechanism design: a Myersonian approach
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
- Haggling over substitutes
- Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations
- Mixed bundling in oligopoly markets
- Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
- Multistage Games with Communication
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal dynamic contracting: the first-order approach and beyond
- Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
- Optimal mechanism for selling two goods
- Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
- Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre-Project Planning
- Optimal sales contracts with withdrawal rights
- Optimal selling mechanisms with buyer price search
- Participation constraints in adverse selection models
- Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process
- Sequential screening
- Sequential versus static screening: an equivalence result
- Shifting supports in Esö and Szentes (2007)
- The scope of sequential screening with ex post participation constraints
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