The dynamics of project standards

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2025.105968MaRDI QIDQ7013190zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Andrew McClellan

Publication date 13 March 2025

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JET.2025.105968

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Principal-agent models (91B43)

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