DEALING WITH MONOTONICITY CONSTRAINTS IN SCREENING PROBLEMS: THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL
DOI10.17654/MS101020215zbMATH Open1366.91107OpenAlexW3122934507MaRDI QIDQ5269530FDOQ5269530
Authors: X. Ruiz del Portal 
Publication date: 27 June 2017
Published in: Far East Journal of Mathematical Sciences (FJMS) (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.pphmj.com/abstract/10469.htm
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optimal control theorymonotonicity constraintsoptimal contractscreening problemswell-behaved solutions
Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Applications of optimal control and differential games (49N90) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)
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- Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process
- A general principal-agent setting with non-differentiable mechanisms: Some examples
- Satisficing and maximizing consumers in a monopolistic screening model
- Non-smooth monotonicity constraints in optimal control problems: some economic applications
- Monotonicity in direct revelation mechanisms
- Reversals of signal-posterior monotonicity imply a bias of screening
- On the existence of positive equilibrium profits in competitive screening markets
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