Matching in the large: an experimental study

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2018.04.004MaRDI QIDQ1651242zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Y. Aharonov

Publication date 12 July 2018

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.04.004

zbMATH Keywords

experimentmatchingscaleschool choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

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• Efficiency of Large Double Auctions
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
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Cited in

(6)

• Tie-breaking and efficiency in the laboratory school choice
• Matching strategies of heterogeneous agents under incomplete information in a university clearinghouse
• Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: evidence from China's college admissions
• Information acquisition and provision in school choice: an experimental study
• Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: an experimental study
• Graded Matching for Large Observational Studies

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

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