The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by A Natural Experiments*

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Publication:4495436

DOI10.1162/003355300554719zbMath0963.91508OpenAlexW2119421468MaRDI QIDQ4495436

John H. Kagel, Alvin E. Roth

Publication date: 21 June 2001

Published in: Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1162/003355300554719




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