Unravelling in two-sided matching markets and similarity of preferences
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Publication:980964
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.11.009zbMath1230.91145OpenAlexW3125451269MaRDI QIDQ980964
Publication date: 8 July 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/09-068.pdf
Related Items (9)
Satisfied two-sided matching: a method considering elation and disappointment of agents ⋮ The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets ⋮ The (Non)-Existence of Stable Mechanisms in Incomplete Information Environments ⋮ Many-to-one matchings without substitutability ⋮ Unraveling over time ⋮ Preferences and the price of stability in matching markets ⋮ What price stability? Social welfare in matching markets ⋮ Exploding offers and unraveling in two-sided matching markets ⋮ Gradual college admission
Cites Work
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- The dynamics of law clerk matching: an experimental and computational investigation of proposals for reform of the market
- Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
- Unravelling of Dynamic Sorting
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by A Natural Experiments*
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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