Unravelling in two-sided matching markets and similarity of preferences
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Cites work
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 45086 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
- The dynamics of law clerk matching: an experimental and computational investigation of proposals for reform of the market
- The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by A Natural Experiments*
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- Unravelling of Dynamic Sorting
Cited in
(16)- Satisfied two-sided matching: a method considering elation and disappointment of agents
- Many-to-one matchings without substitutability
- Exploding offers and unraveling in two-sided matching markets
- Preferences and the price of stability in matching markets
- Two-sided heterogeneity, endogenous sharing, and international matching markets
- Gradual college admission
- Role of common preferences in the outcome of many-to-many matching
- Unraveling over time
- The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets
- Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets
- What price stability? Social welfare in matching markets
- On the survival of some unstable two-sided matching mechanisms
- Unravelling of Dynamic Sorting
- The (Non)-Existence of Stable Mechanisms in Incomplete Information Environments
- Strategic complementarities and unraveling in matching markets
- Resolute and symmetric mechanisms for two-sided matching problems
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