The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets

DOI10.1007/S00199-012-0695-1zbMATH Open1275.91097OpenAlexW3123203207MaRDI QIDQ2376989FDOQ2376989

Authors Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan

Publication date 26 June 2013

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0695-1

zbMATH Keywords

matchingstabilitywelfareunravelingpre-arrangement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Welfare economics (91B15) Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?
• Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
• Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
• Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
• Mixed strategies in games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
• On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
• Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• The dynamics of law clerk matching: an experimental and computational investigation of proposals for reform of the market
• Unravelling in two-sided matching markets and similarity of preferences

Cited in

(7)

• Application fee manipulations in matching markets
• Welfare Effects of Dynamic Matching: An Empirical Analysis
• Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems
• The (Non)-Existence of Stable Mechanisms in Incomplete Information Environments
• Incompatibility between stability and consistency
• An analysis of the German university admissions system
• Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation

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