The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets

DOI10.1007/s00199-012-0695-1zbMath1275.91097OpenAlexW3123203207MaRDI QIDQ2376989

Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan

Publication date: 26 June 2013

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0695-1

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitymatchingwelfareunravelingpre-arrangement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68) Welfare economics (91B15)

Related Items (6)

The (Non)-Existence of Stable Mechanisms in Incomplete Information Environments ⋮ An analysis of the German university admissions system ⋮ Incompatibility between stability and consistency ⋮ Application fee manipulations in matching markets ⋮ Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems ⋮ Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation

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• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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