Mixed strategies in games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets

DOI10.1007/S00355-006-0139-6MaRDI QIDQ2431838zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Fuhito Kojima

Publication date 24 October 2006

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0139-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80)

Recommendations

• Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
• Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria
• Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket
• Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
• Approximate Purification of Mixed Strategies

Cites work

• Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
• Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
• Non-cooperative games
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem

Cited in

(14)

• On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
• The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets
• When preference misreporting is harm[less]ful?
• Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
• Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets
• Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria
• Competition under different reimbursement systems: The concept of an internet-based hospital management game
• Enrollment manipulations in school choice
• Application fee manipulations in matching markets
• Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems
• Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching
• Optimal truncation in matching markets
• Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket
• Manipulation via capacities revisited

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