Mixed strategies in games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0139-6zbMath1180.91023OpenAlexW1966336485MaRDI QIDQ2431838

Fuhito Kojima

Publication date: 24 October 2006

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0139-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80)

Related Items (11)

Enrollment manipulations in school choice ⋮ Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket ⋮ The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets ⋮ When preference misreporting is harm[lessful?] ⋮ Application fee manipulations in matching markets ⋮ Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems ⋮ Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets ⋮ Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching ⋮ Optimal truncation in matching markets ⋮ On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems ⋮ Manipulation via capacities revisited

Cites Work

• Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?
• Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
• Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
• Non-cooperative games
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Unnamed Item

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