Recommendations
Cites work
- A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
- Application fee manipulations in matching markets
- Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Comparative statics in matching markets
- Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
- Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
- Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures
- Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
- Mixed strategies in games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
- Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
- On cores and indivisibility
- On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
- Robust stability in matching markets
- Some remarks on the stable matching problem
- Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
Cited in
(7)- Common enrollment in school choice
- Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems
- Comparing school choice and college admissions mechanisms by their strategic accessibility
- The superintendent's dilemma: managing school district capacity as parents vote with their feet
- Manipulability in school choice
- On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
- Modifications of Boston, Taiwanese and Chinese mechanisms are not comparable via counting manipulating students
This page was built for publication: Enrollment manipulations in school choice
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q268634)
