Enrollment manipulations in school choice
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Publication:268634
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.02.002zbMath1368.91159OpenAlexW3122160649MaRDI QIDQ268634
Publication date: 15 April 2016
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.02.002
Cites Work
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- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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