Application fee manipulations in matching markets
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Publication:393269
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.08.006zbMath1282.91229OpenAlexW2031240337MaRDI QIDQ393269
Publication date: 16 January 2014
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.08.006
Related Items (6)
Enrollment manipulations in school choice ⋮ When preference misreporting is harm[lessful?] ⋮ Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints ⋮ Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems ⋮ Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach ⋮ Graduate admission with financial support
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