Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints

DOI10.1007/S00182-016-0564-4MaRDI QIDQ1677256zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Azar Abizada

Publication date 10 November 2017

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-016-0564-4

zbMATH Keywords

budget constraintpairwise stabilitypath to stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Stability and incentives for college admissions with budget constraints
• Stability and strategy-proofness for college admissions with an eligibility criterion
• College admissions with stable score-limits
• The College Admissions Problem Revisited
• Strategic issues in college admissions with score-limits
• Median stable matching for college admissions
• Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
• Financial aid and early admissions at selective need-blind colleges
• Limited choice in college admissions: an experimental study
• The college admissions problem with lower and common quotas

Cites work

• A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
• A labor market with heterogeneous firms and workers
• Application fee manipulations in matching markets
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods
• Cores of convex games
• Equilibria and Indivisibilities: Gross Substitutes and Complements
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3558960 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099363 (Why is no real title available?)
• Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Matching with (branch-of-choice) contracts at the United States Military Academy
• On a characterization of stable matchings
• Paths to stability for matching markets with couples
• Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
• Random paths to stability in the roommate problem
• Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
• Stability and incentives for college admissions with budget constraints
• Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem

Cited in

(9)

• Limited choice in college admissions: an experimental study
• Strategic issues in college admissions with score-limits
• Graduate admission with financial support
• College admissions with tuition transfers
• College curriculum, diverging selectivity, and enrollment expansion
• The College Admissions Problem Revisited
• Stability and incentives for college admissions with budget constraints
• Weighted matching markets with budget constraints
• Financial aid in college admissions: need-based versus merit-based

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