Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints
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Publication:1677256
DOI10.1007/s00182-016-0564-4zbMath1415.91211OpenAlexW2528406312MaRDI QIDQ1677256
Publication date: 10 November 2017
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-016-0564-4
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