Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited

DOI10.1007/s00355-016-1024-6zbMath1392.91126OpenAlexW3122518123WikidataQ125741556 ScholiaQ125741556MaRDI QIDQ2628708

Inácio Bó, C.-Philipp Heller

Publication date: 2 June 2017

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/141423

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumschool choiceBoston mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures
• School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms
• Manipulation via capacities revisited
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
• Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
• Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications
• The modified Boston mechanism
• Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
• The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
• Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria
• Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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