Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited

DOI10.1007/S00355-016-1024-6MaRDI QIDQ2628708zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Inácio Bó, C.-Philipp Heller

Publication date 2 June 2017

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://hdl.handle.net/10419/141423

zbMATH Keywords

Boston mechanismNash equilibriumschool choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures
• When is the Boston mechanism strategy-proof?
• The modified Boston mechanism
• Constrained school choice
• On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems

Cites work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
• Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures
• Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• Manipulation via capacities revisited
• Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
• School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms
• Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications
• The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
• The modified Boston mechanism
• Truncation strategies in matching markets
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods

Cited in

(11)

• On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
• Level-k reasoning in school choice
• Matching strategies of heterogeneous agents under incomplete information in a university clearinghouse
• Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: evidence from China's college admissions
• Priority-driven behaviors under the Boston mechanism
• The modified Boston mechanism
• Enrollment manipulations in school choice
• Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems
• When is the Boston mechanism strategy-proof?
• A modification aimed at reducing the manipulability and inefficiency of the Boston school choice mechanism
• Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures

This page was built for publication: Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2628708)