Multidimensional screening with precise seller information
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 512353 (Why is no real title available?)
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- Rational groupthink
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- The Law of Large Demand for Information
- The Sample Complexity of Up-to-ε Multi-dimensional Revenue Maximization
- The accuracy of the normal approximation for estimates of vector parameters
- The complexity of optimal mechanism design
- The optimality of upgrade pricing
- The sample complexity of revenue maximization
- When is pure bundling optimal?
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