Welfare maximization with deferred acceptance auctions in reallocation problems

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-48350-3_67MaRDI QIDQ3452842zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Anthony Kim

Publication date 19 November 2015

Published in Algorithms - ESA 2015 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1507.01353

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Abstract: We design approximate weakly group strategy-proof mechanisms for resource reallocation problems using Milgrom and Segal's deferred acceptance auction framework: the radio spectrum and network bandwidth reallocation problems in the procurement auction setting and the cost minimization problem with set cover constraints in the selling auction setting. Our deferred acceptance auctions are derived from simple greedy algorithms for the underlying optimization problems and guarantee approximately optimal social welfare (cost) of the agents retaining their rights (contracts). In the reallocation problems, we design procurement auctions to purchase agents' broadcast/access rights to free up some of the resources such that the unpurchased rights can still be exercised with respect to the remaining resources. In the cost minimization problem, we design a selling auction to sell early termination rights to agents with existing contracts such that some minimal constraints are still satisfied with remaining contracts. In these problems, while the "allocated" agents transact, exchanging rights and payments, the objective and feasibility constraints are on the "rejected" agents.

Recommendations

• The performance of deferred-acceptance auctions
• Strategyproof auction mechanisms for network procurement
• Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms
• Multilateral deferred-acceptance mechanisms
• Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics

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Cited in

(5)

• Ex-ante welfare superiority of the Boston mechanism over the deferred acceptance mechanism
• Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
• Welfare maximization with deferred acceptance auctions in reallocation problems
• The performance of deferred-acceptance auctions
• Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms for Machine Scheduling.

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