Strongly budget balanced auctions for multi-sided markets
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Publication:2238720
DOI10.1016/J.ARTINT.2021.103548OpenAlexW3175184292MaRDI QIDQ2238720FDOQ2238720
Authors: Dvir Gilor, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi 
Publication date: 2 November 2021
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.08094
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