Strongly budget balanced auctions for multi-sided markets

DOI10.1016/J.ARTINT.2021.103548MaRDI QIDQ2238720zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dvir Gilor, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi

Publication date 2 November 2021

Published in Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.08094

zbMATH Keywords

multi-sided marketsstrongly budget balanced auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Artificial intelligence (68Txx)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5343724 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2119762 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2243363 (Why is no real title available?)
• A dominant strategy double auction
• Agent competition double-auction mechanism
• Approximately Efficient Double Auctions with Strong Budget Balance
• Approximating gains-from-trade in bilateral trading
• Bulow-Klemperer-Style Results for Welfare Maximization in Two-Sided Markets
• Chain: a dynamic double auction framework for matching patient agents
• Efficient auction mechanisms for supply chain procurement
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• ICE: an expressive iterative combinatorial exchange
• Incentives in Teams
• Maximum bounded 3-dimensional matching is MAX SNP-complete
• Modularity and greed in double auctions
• Reducibility among combinatorial problems
• Removal and threshold pricing: truthful two-sided markets with multi-dimensional participants
• SBBA: a strongly-budget-balanced double-auction mechanism
• Undominated Groves mechanisms

Cited in

(7)

• Multilateral deferred-acceptance mechanisms
• Ascending-price mechanism for general multi-sided markets
• Weak and strong multimarket bidding rings
• SBBA: a strongly-budget-balanced double-auction mechanism
• Symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations in multi-sided assignment markets
• Approximately Efficient Double Auctions with Strong Budget Balance
• Truthful Mechanisms for Two-Sided Markets via Prophet Inequalities

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