Revenue Maximization for Market Intermediation with Correlated Priors

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-53354-3_22zbMath1403.91172OpenAlexW2516752364MaRDI QIDQ2819465

Matthias Gerstgrasser, Elias Koutsoupias, Paul W. Goldberg

Publication date: 29 September 2016

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:81862785-8040-49a3-adca-fbede1f2e235

zbMATH Keywords

double auctionNP-completenessrevenue maximizationconstant number of buyers and sellers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Software, source code, etc. for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-04)

Related Items (1)

Dynamic Double Auctions: Toward First Best

Cites Work

• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• A dominant strategy double auction
• Modularity and greed in double auctions
• Revenue maximization in a Bayesian double auction market
• Simple and Near-Optimal Mechanisms for Market Intermediation
• Optimal Auction Design
• Approximately Efficient Double Auctions with Strong Budget Balance
• Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices
• On optimal single-item auctions
• Optimal auctions with correlated bidders are easy

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