Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods
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Publication:1941981
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
- Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
- Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods
- Incentive compatibility and incomplete information
- Incentive compatibility and individual rationality in public good economies
- Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Nonmanipulable decision mechanisms for economic environments
- Nonmanipulable voting schemes when participants' interests are partially decomposable
- On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies
- On the Nonexistence of a Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Making Optimal Public Decisions
- Robust implementation in direct mechanisms
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Strategy-Proof Exchange
- Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for pure public goods economies when preferences are monotonic
- Strategy-proof and Symmetric Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies
- Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies
- Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies: a note.
- Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
- Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategy-proofness versus efficiency for small domains of preferences over public goods
Cited in
(24)- Efficient strategy-proof allocation functions in linear production economies
- Domain expansion of the pivotal mechanism
- Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear
- Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem
- The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally
- STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIA WITH PARTIALLY CONSUMABLE WITHHOLDINGS
- Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules in allotment economies
- Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods
- Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems
- Optimal budget-balanced ranking mechanisms to assign identical objects
- A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies
- Egalitarian division under Leontief preferences
- Characterizations of strategy-proof mechanisms for excludable versus nonexcludable public projects
- Strategyproof allocation mechanisms with endowments and M-convex distributional constraints
- Locally efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in exchange economies
- Strategy-proof allocation of fixed costs
- Strategy-proofness versus efficiency for small domains of preferences over public goods
- Equivalence and strategy-proofness of no anonymous priority resource allocation mechanisms
- Strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms in economies with pure public goods.
- Undominated mechanisms and the provision of a pure public good in two agent economies
- Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with an indivisible good
- Non-dictatorial public distribution rules
- A competitive equilibrium for a warm-glow economy
- Strategy-proof compromises
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