Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods
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Publication:1941981
DOI10.1007/S00199-011-0627-5zbMATH Open1282.91198OpenAlexW2029600470MaRDI QIDQ1941981FDOQ1941981
Diego Moreno, María José Moscoso
Publication date: 25 March 2013
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0627-5
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Public goods (91B18)
Cites Work
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Cited In (16)
- Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem
- Strategy-proofness versus efficiency for small domains of preferences over public goods
- Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems
- Strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms in economies with pure public goods.
- Strategy-proof allocation of fixed costs
- A competitive equilibrium for a warm-glow economy
- Efficient strategy-proof allocation functions in linear production economies
- The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally
- Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with an indivisible good
- Characterizations of strategy-proof mechanisms for excludable versus nonexcludable public projects
- Optimal budget-balanced ranking mechanisms to assign identical objects
- Egalitarian division under Leontief preferences
- Strategyproof allocation mechanisms with endowments and M-convex distributional constraints
- Undominated mechanisms and the provision of a pure public good in two agent economies
- Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules in allotment economies
- STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIA WITH PARTIALLY CONSUMABLE WITHHOLDINGS
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