Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods
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Publication:1941981
DOI10.1007/s00199-011-0627-5zbMath1282.91198OpenAlexW2029600470MaRDI QIDQ1941981
Diego Moreno, María José Moscoso
Publication date: 25 March 2013
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0627-5
Public goods (91B18) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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