Strategy-proof mechanisms of public good economies

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(96)00823-2zbMATH Open0918.90049MaRDI QIDQ1277458FDOQ1277458

Shinji Ohseto

Publication date: 4 August 1999

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

voluntary participationmechanismsstrategy-proofnesscost share rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods
• Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
• A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
• Cost share equilibria: a Lindahlian approach
• Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods
• Incentive compatibility and individual rationality in public good economies
• Nonmanipulable voting schemes when participants' interests are partially decomposable

Cited In (12)

• Strategy-proofness versus efficiency for small domains of preferences over public goods
• Cheating for the common good in a macroeconomic policy game.
• Cooperative production and efficiency
• Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods.
• Strength in numbers: robust mechanisms for public goods with many agents
• Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
• On the generic impossibility of truthful behavior: A simple approach
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Characterizations of strategy-proof mechanisms for excludable versus nonexcludable public projects
• Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear
• Dynamic Procedures and Incentives in Public Good Economies
• Undominated mechanisms and the provision of a pure public good in two agent economies

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