Strategy-proof mechanisms of public good economies
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Publication:1277458
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 679846 (Why is no real title available?)
- A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
- Cost share equilibria: a Lindahlian approach
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- Nonmanipulable voting schemes when participants' interests are partially decomposable
- Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
- Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
Cited in
(28)- Strategy-proof cost sharing, ability to pay and free provision of an indivisible public good.
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1784400 (Why is no real title available?)
- Domain expansion of the pivotal mechanism
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- Strength in numbers: robust mechanisms for public goods with many agents
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- Strategy-proof compromises
- Efficient mechanisms for a partially public good.
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