Dynamic Procedures and Incentives in Public Good Economies
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Publication:4286287
DOI10.2307/2951645zbMATH Open0804.90028OpenAlexW2044538195MaRDI QIDQ4286287FDOQ4286287
Authors: P. Chander
Publication date: 27 March 1994
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2951645
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local incentive compatibilityone private goodone public goodconvex technologyequitable cost sharinginformationally decentralized dynamic nontatonnement procedure
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