Dynamic Procedures and Incentives in Public Good Economies

DOI10.2307/2951645MaRDI QIDQ4286287zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors P. Chander

Publication date 27 March 1994

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2951645

zbMATH Keywords

local incentive compatibilityone private goodone public goodconvex technologyequitable cost sharinginformationally decentralized dynamic nontatonnement procedure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

• Incentive compatibility without compensation
• Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies
• Sharing the cost of a public good: an incentive-constrained axiomatic approach
• Dynamic implementation in two-agent economies
• Strategy-proof mechanisms of public good economies

Cited in

(6)

• Dynamic provision of public goods
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3974667 (Why is no real title available?)
• The gamma-core and coalition formation
• The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
• Price-quantity duality in planning procedures
• Incentive compatibility without compensation

This page was built for publication: Dynamic Procedures and Incentives in Public Good Economies

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4286287)