Strategy-proof cost sharing, ability to pay and free provision of an indivisible public good.
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Publication:1398329
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(03)00026-XzbMATH Open1042.91552OpenAlexW2085382615MaRDI QIDQ1398329FDOQ1398329
Tae Kun Seo, R. Deb, Laura Razzolini
Publication date: 29 July 2003
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(03)00026-x
Cites Work
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- Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
- Incentives in Teams
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- Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
- Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods
- Inequality reducing properties of composite taxation
- Efficient Provision of a Discrete Public Good
- Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies: a note.
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