Inequality reducing properties of composite taxation

DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.0038zbMATH Open0852.90058OpenAlexW1981713347MaRDI QIDQ1920927FDOQ1920927

Alain Trannoy, Patrick Moyes, Michel Le Breton

Publication date: 9 December 1996

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/947bf0ecaea7d15c0aef4a42520e48dbe18acd07

zbMATH Keywords

income distributionstax systemsegalitarian principle

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Cited In (10)

• Strategy-proof cost sharing, ability to pay and free provision of an indivisible public good.
• Characterizations of egalitarian binary relations as transitive closures with a special reference to Lorenz dominance and to single-crossing conditions
• Lorenz dominance for transformed income distributions: a simple proof
• Redistributive effects of minimal equal sacrifice taxation.
• Talents, preferences and income inequality
• Market demand elasticity and income inequality
• Inequality minimising subsidy and taxation
• BANKRUPTCY RULES AND COALITIONAL MANIPULATION
• ERRATUM: "BANKRUPTCY RULES AND COALITIONAL MANIPULATION"
• Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods

This page was built for publication: Inequality reducing properties of composite taxation

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1920927)