Inequality reducing properties of composite taxation
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Publication:1920927
DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.0038zbMath0852.90058MaRDI QIDQ1920927
Alain Trannoy, Patrick Moyes, Michel Le Breton
Publication date: 9 December 1996
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/947bf0ecaea7d15c0aef4a42520e48dbe18acd07
91B64: Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation)
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