Domain expansion of the pivotal mechanism
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2268895
Recommendations
- Strategy-proof mechanisms of public good economies
- Welfare asymptotics of the pivotal mechanism for excludable public goods.
- Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods
- Undominated mechanisms and the provision of a pure public good in two agent economies
- On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget
Cites work
- A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
- A Note on the Characterization of Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences
- Asymptotic efficiency of the pivotal mechanism with general project space
- Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3650233 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incentives in Teams
- On Coalition Incentive Compatibility
- On the existence of optimal truth-dominant mechanisms
- On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies
- On the Nonexistence of a Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Making Optimal Public Decisions
- Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations
- Vickrey allocation rule with income effect
Cited in
(4)- Welfare asymptotics of the pivotal mechanism for excludable public goods.
- An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear
- The uniqueness of the pivotal mechanisms without strategy-proofness
- Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money
This page was built for publication: Domain expansion of the pivotal mechanism
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2268895)
