Non-dictatorial public distribution rules
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2149190
Recommendations
- Strategy proofness and Pareto efficiency in quasilinear exchange economies
- Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods
- Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods
- Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
- Strategy-proof and Symmetric Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3238721 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
- Efficiency and truthfulness with Leontief preferences. A note on two-agent, two-good economies
- Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in many-agent economies
- Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees.
- Non fixed-price trading rules in single-crossing classical exchange economies
- On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies
- Strategy proofness and Pareto efficiency in quasilinear exchange economies
- Strategy-Proof Exchange
Cited in
(2)
This page was built for publication: Non-dictatorial public distribution rules
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2149190)