Non-dictatorial public distribution rules
DOI10.1007/S10058-021-00262-7zbMATH Open1494.91049OpenAlexW3197021755MaRDI QIDQ2149190FDOQ2149190
Authors: Mridu Prabal Goswami 
Publication date: 28 June 2022
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00262-7
Recommendations
- Strategy proofness and Pareto efficiency in quasilinear exchange economies
- Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods
- Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods
- Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
- Strategy-proof and Symmetric Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies
strategy-proofnessPareto-efficiencyquasi-linear preferencesequal treatment of the equalsPareto-efficiency in the rangepublic distribution
Social choice (91B14) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies
- Strategy-Proof Exchange
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees.
- Strategy proofness and Pareto efficiency in quasilinear exchange economies
- Efficiency and truthfulness with Leontief preferences. A note on two-agent, two-good economies
- Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in many-agent economies
- Non fixed-price trading rules in single-crossing classical exchange economies
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