Non-dictatorial public distribution rules

DOI10.1007/S10058-021-00262-7zbMath1494.91049OpenAlexW3197021755MaRDI QIDQ2149190

Mridu Prabal Goswami

Publication date: 28 June 2022

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00262-7

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessPareto-efficiencyquasi-linear preferencesequal treatment of the equalsPareto-efficiency in the rangepublic distribution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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• Efficiency and truthfulness with Leontief preferences. A note on two-agent, two-good economies
• Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees.
• Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in many-agent economies
• Non fixed-price trading rules in single-crossing classical exchange economies
• On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies
• Strategy proofness and Pareto efficiency in quasilinear exchange economies
• Strategy-Proof Exchange

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