Constrained dictatorial rules are subject to variable-population paradoxes

DOI10.1007/S11238-023-09975-3MaRDI QIDQ6611991zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors William Thomson

Publication date 27 September 2024

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S11238-023-09975-3

zbMATH Keywords

constrained priority rulesendowment-splitting-proofnessendowments-merging-proofnesspre-delivery-proofnessresource allocation ruleswithdrawal-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• New variable-population paradoxes for resource allocation
• Variable population manipulations of reallocation rules in economies with single-peaked preferences
• Continuous selections from the Pareto correspondence and non-manipulability in exchange economies
• Allocation rules are very generally vulnerable to the strategic withholding of endowments
• Non-dictatorial public distribution rules

Cites work

• A note on Gale's example
• A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud
• Can everyone benefit from innovation?
• Manipulation via Endowments
• New variable-population paradoxes for resource allocation
• Non-manipulable division rules in claim problems and generalizations
• On Scheduling Fees to Prevent Merging, Splitting, and Transferring of Jobs
• Paradoxes of Preferential Voting
• Progressive and merging-proof taxation
• Proportional scheduling, split-proofness, and merge-proofness
• The axiomatics of economic design, Vol. 1. An introduction to theory and methods
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule

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